Chinese intelligence agents are actively targeting political aides in Canada, often exploiting unsuspecting staffers who show no strong views on China, according to a newly-disclosed secret memo from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Blacklock's Reporter says the memo, dated September 8, 2021, explains how these aides, acting as "gatekeepers" for MPs and senators, can be manipulated to serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)."The People’s Republic of China targets political staffers," the memo stated. "Staffers control schedules and often act as ‘gatekeepers’ for their employers. These staff are therefore placed in positions where they can clandestinely and deceptively control and influence the activities of elected and appointed officials in ways that support Chinese or Communist Party interests."The document, titled People’s Republic Of China Foreign Interference In Canada: A Critical National Security Threat, outlines how Chinese agents can influence Canadian politicians through their aides. This can include steering the MP or senator away from certain community groups, shaping talking points to align with CCP narratives, or arranging public events in locations significant to China.The memo stresses that political aides don’t have to be outspoken supporters of China to be co-opted. “Foreign interference activities often transcend party lines, ideologies and ethnic backgrounds and often take place over a period of several years,” CSIS wrote. "Chinese foreign threat actors are pragmatic and tend to pursue paths of least resistance."According to the document, Chinese intelligence categorizes individuals into three groups: supporters of China, those who are neutral but could be persuaded to adopt pro-China stances, and those who are firmly opposed to China. The CCP focuses on co-opting those who are ambivalent, convincing them to adopt China-friendly positions or to criticize "anti-China" positions, such as raising human rights concerns or visiting Taiwan in an official capacity.The memo emphasized the uniqueness of China’s foreign interference strategy, noting that no other country rivals its sophistication in espionage. “China’s foreign interference activities in Canada continue to be sophisticated, pervasive and persistent,” it stated.CSIS also described how the CCP uses a broad network of both overt and covert resources to achieve its goals, including leveraging party, government, and non-government actors. "China is the foremost perpetrator of foreign interference activity," the memo said, highlighting that the CCP pragmatically targets all levels of Canadian government, including provincial and municipal levels.The primary objective of China’s interference, according to the memo, is to advance the interests of the CCP while reinforcing its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. The nine-page memo, marked "secret, Canadian eyes only," was disclosed by the Commission on Foreign Interference, providing a rare glimpse into the scale and strategy behind Chinese espionage efforts in Canada.
Chinese intelligence agents are actively targeting political aides in Canada, often exploiting unsuspecting staffers who show no strong views on China, according to a newly-disclosed secret memo from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Blacklock's Reporter says the memo, dated September 8, 2021, explains how these aides, acting as "gatekeepers" for MPs and senators, can be manipulated to serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)."The People’s Republic of China targets political staffers," the memo stated. "Staffers control schedules and often act as ‘gatekeepers’ for their employers. These staff are therefore placed in positions where they can clandestinely and deceptively control and influence the activities of elected and appointed officials in ways that support Chinese or Communist Party interests."The document, titled People’s Republic Of China Foreign Interference In Canada: A Critical National Security Threat, outlines how Chinese agents can influence Canadian politicians through their aides. This can include steering the MP or senator away from certain community groups, shaping talking points to align with CCP narratives, or arranging public events in locations significant to China.The memo stresses that political aides don’t have to be outspoken supporters of China to be co-opted. “Foreign interference activities often transcend party lines, ideologies and ethnic backgrounds and often take place over a period of several years,” CSIS wrote. "Chinese foreign threat actors are pragmatic and tend to pursue paths of least resistance."According to the document, Chinese intelligence categorizes individuals into three groups: supporters of China, those who are neutral but could be persuaded to adopt pro-China stances, and those who are firmly opposed to China. The CCP focuses on co-opting those who are ambivalent, convincing them to adopt China-friendly positions or to criticize "anti-China" positions, such as raising human rights concerns or visiting Taiwan in an official capacity.The memo emphasized the uniqueness of China’s foreign interference strategy, noting that no other country rivals its sophistication in espionage. “China’s foreign interference activities in Canada continue to be sophisticated, pervasive and persistent,” it stated.CSIS also described how the CCP uses a broad network of both overt and covert resources to achieve its goals, including leveraging party, government, and non-government actors. "China is the foremost perpetrator of foreign interference activity," the memo said, highlighting that the CCP pragmatically targets all levels of Canadian government, including provincial and municipal levels.The primary objective of China’s interference, according to the memo, is to advance the interests of the CCP while reinforcing its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. The nine-page memo, marked "secret, Canadian eyes only," was disclosed by the Commission on Foreign Interference, providing a rare glimpse into the scale and strategy behind Chinese espionage efforts in Canada.
